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Tom Hanauer's thoughtful discussion of my paper "The Pleasures of 
Contra-Purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human" (2014) puts 
pressure on two important issues concerning the affective phenomenology 
of the sublime. My aim in that paper was to present an analysis of the 
sublime that does not suffer from the problems identified by Jane Forsey in 
her "Is A Theory of the Sublime Possible?" (2007). I argued that Kant's 
notion of reflective judgment can help with this task, because it allows us to 
capture the experience of failure that characterises the sublime, without 
committing us to ontologically transcendent items. In a significant departure 
from Kant, however, my account does not require references to our moral 
vocation to explain the pleasure we take in the sublime; the pleasure comes 
from getting the right measure of our agency. For Hanauer, trouble for my 
analysis comes both from the discursive presentation of the sublime, its 
focus on judgement, and from the removal of referenes to our moral 
vocation.  
 
1. We may call the first problem, the problem of too much thought. For 
many commentators what is exciting about the sublime is that we get some 
cognitive gain without the cumbersome intervention of the understanding. 
For others, however, intellecualist assimptions to do with the grounds of our 
moral superiority over-rationalise the Kantian sublime.1 Hanauer argues that 
my morally unadorned version remains vulnerable to this latter criticism 
because it relies on the complex mechanism of reflective judgement. As a 
result, the experience is overthought and underfelt.  
 
In response, I should start by clarifying that the emphasis on judgement in 
the original presentation was dialectically motivated, by the context of the 
problems the paper sought to address. 2  Still, the sublime is not just a 
judgement. It is also a feeling. Hanauer's concern with the phenomenology 
of the sublime raises an important question about this feeling and its 
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relation to the judgement. Explaining how I see this relation should also 
help with Hanauer's question, whether the position I defend is cognitivist. 
 
'Feeling [Gefühl]' Kant says should be used to mean a 'subjective sensation' 
that refers to pleasure and displeasure (5:206). By contrast, an 'objective 
sensation' refers to items such as colours, e.g. the 'green' of the meadows. 
To say that green is an objective sensation is not to make colour an intrinsic 
property of the object, nor to challenge the idea that colour is a secondary 
quality (see B 45, A 30, Mrongovius 29:856). Rather, it is to grant colour 
reality in appearance (cf. A 169, B 211). Colour is characteristic of a way in 
which we perceive the world, namely by sight (see Mrongovius ibid.). The 
sensation is objective because colour perception allows us to establish 
reliable connections to our environment. Feelings, that is, pleasure (Lust) 
and displeasure (Unlust) differ from objective sensations because they tell us 
nothing about the ‘constitution of the object’ (5:207) or about the subject 
itself (5:206). Kant's rather emphatic denial of cognitive role to pleasure and 
displeasure is puzzling, because, if one feels pleasure, one at least knows 
that much about oneself, namely that they are feeling it. I think we should 
take this denial as stating, pretty uncontroversially, that, in contrast to 
objective sensations, there is no distinctive sense modality associated with 
the sensation of pleasure or displeasure and so no characteristic mode of 
perception through which we establish a reliable connection to the 
environment. This leaves the possibility of further specification of the 
feeling in conjucntion, say, with a judgement, so that it can have a cognitive 
role.3  
 
The sublime is a peculiar sort of feeling in that it combines pleasure with 
displeasure. Following Kant, in the original paper, I connected each valence 
respectively to purposiveness and contrapurposiveness in a unified 
judgement of the sublime. How should this relation beteween feeling and 
judgement be understood? In examining the alternatives below I will be 
staying close to Kant's presentation of the sublime, because I think it offers 
us the conceptual resources to formulate an interesting as well as plausible 
account of this relation.  
 
1.1. One option is accompaniment, the judgement 'this is sublime' 
accompanies the feeling, in the sense that it is a verbal rendering of the 
feeling: we see the bold overhanging cliffs, we feel the peculiar pleasure that 
is the sublime and 'call these objects sublime' (5:261).  
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Accompaniment states that feeling comes first, the person experiencing the 
feeling then 'calls' it, "this is sublime", in the same way that a tickle can be 
followed by "this is ticklish", and so on. Kant's discussion of the dynamic 
sublime complicates matters somewhat. Kant claims that someone who is 
afraid cannot 'judge about the sublime in nature' (5:261). Accompaniment has 
at first no trouble with this: for the scared, the corresponding judgement is 
"this is scary", not "this is sublime". But this is not how Kant elaborates the 
point. He says that 'it is impossible to find satisfaction in a terror that is 
seriously intended' (5:262). This is not because fear overwhelms other 
feelings, but rather because an environmental condition for the arousal of 
the feeling of the sublime has not been met and a fear response is 
appropriate (5:262, 264). There is something wrong, Kant suggests, with a 
person who does not fear and seek to avoid a genuinely threatening object 
(5:261). So it looks as if the feeling of pleasure in the sublime is not possible 
without a prior estimate about whether the situation is genuinely 
threatening or not. 
 
1.2. The second option, precedence, follows from the above: judging preceds 
feeling.4 This chimes with Kant's claim that 'the disposition of the mind to 
the feeling of the sublime requires its receptivity to ideas' (5:265). Among the 
relevant ideas one would have to include ideas about the object, the 
observer's situation with respect to the object, the observer's identity as 
agent, or following the moral direction of Kant's argument, moral ideas.  
 
Precedence certainly falls foul of the too much thought problem. What 
counts in its favour is that it distinguishes clearly between the object that 
arouses the feeling and what the feeling is about. Such distinction is needed 
to make sense of Kant's insistence that objects in nature arouse 'this feeling 
in us' (5:264) yet the sublime is not 'contained in anything in nature' (5:264). 
For precedence the feeling is about whatever the judgement is about. The 
propositional content of the judgement -or judgements- involved allows us 
to establish criteria of application of the concept of the sublime and also to 
differentiate between feelings. So if some elements are missing, if for 
example, we judge we are in peril after all, then the feeling changes.  
 
Aside from the risk of overintellectualising the experience of the sublime, 
another drawback is that according to precedence failure to be moved 
moved 'by that we judge to be sublime' (5:265) must be explained by missing 
out on some judgement. When Kant envisages two people side by side in 
front of the same object, he says of the one of the two is not moved that the 
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man has 'no feeling [Gefühl]' (5:265), not that has not put enough thought to 
it.  
 
1.3. The final option, which I shall recommend, is receptivity from the earlier 
claim about receptivity (Empfänglichkeit) to ideas. Kant associates judgement 
and more generally thought with activity. What is it to be receptive to ideas 
in this context?5  
 
A clue, I think, is to be found in the claim that the sublime 'pleases 
immediately' (5:267) and that it consists in a relation in which the 
representation of nature is judged in a certain way (ibid.). The portion about 
pleasure is no surprise, the sublime is a feeling after all. What is in need of 
interpretation is how this immediate feeling consists of a relation with 
cognitive content: something is represented in a certain way and judged to 
be so and so. 6 I will gloss this as follows: feeling giving us access to this 
cognitive content. I will explain the feeling/ judgement relation using first a 
non-Kantian example, pain.7  
 
The feeling of pain in my thumb, which pains immediately (i.e. I am not 
inferring the presence of the pain), can reasonably be described also as 
consisting in a relation insofar as it tells me that there is possibly something 
wrong with my thumb. Were I suffering from a pathological condition, such 
as congenital analgesia, something could be wrong with my thumb, but I 
would not be apprised of it through the feeling of pain. I take it that the man 
with no feeling, in Kant's example, is in a similar situation with the 
congenitally analgesic: he can’t feel the sublime and so can’t have access to 
the cognitive content of the judgement through the feeling.8 This path is 
closed off to him. By contrast, if the person who is moved by the sublime 
has access to some cognitive content. The feeling of the sublime tells us 
about the experiencing subject, though not their bodily or mental states, it is 
not about them as an individual at all, it tells us something the sort of being 
she is.  
 
2. This brings us to the second problem. Let's call it the problem of lurking 
triviality. If, as I argue, we experience our agency as passive, as thwarted and 
finite, then, Hanauer responds, mere awareness of being able to pursue 
some end, however mundane, such as making a cup of coffee, cannot 
account for the sublime pleasure experienced at the encounter with a 
terrifying or immeasurable object. To feel such pleasure, we need some 
appropriately elevated ends.  
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This is how Hanauer presents the argument: First, we are more likely to 
experience pleasure, if we contemplate ends that matter to us. Second, the 
ends of reason matter, they are those we 'care most deeply about' (xx). 
Therefore, it is awareness of my ability to 'set, pursue, and actualize those 
ends' (xx) that most plausibly generates a sublimely pleasurable encounter 
with the object we judge as contra-purposive.  
 
 I think the second premise is questionable because there is a gap between 
the objective mattering of the ends of reason and the subjective experience 
of such mattering, a gap Kant uses to explain why morality appears to us in 
the foorm of a command.  If we take this seriously, then it cannot be taken 
as a given that for any particular subject, who experiences a contrapurposive 
object, the ends that in fact most matter to that subject are the ends of 
reason. What we can say with certainty with respect to any particular 
subject, from a Kantian perspective, is that the ends of reason ought to 
matter to them. If on the other hand, the sublime is a kind of moral 
illumination, suddenly making us aware of what matters to us, then the 
mattering claim would be in the conclusion not in the premise.  
 
The argument can be reconstructed so that the second premise is: we 
experience pleasure confronted with the immeasurable and the terrifying. 
The conclusion then would be: So we must have become aware of ends that 
matter most to us, which, given sufficent thought, leads us to contemplate 
our moral vocation. This is plausibly Kantian, but it looks now as if pleasure 
is an occasion for thought, rather than pleasure being in the thought. More 
importantly, if the theory becomes dependent to contents of ends, or to 
sorts of ends, it will be a theory about the importance we attach to those 
contents or sorts of ends.  I take it as a desideratum for a theory of the 
sublime that it remain, if at all possible, a theory about an aesthetic category. 
This can be done, I believe, while addressing the triviality worry by focusing 
on the mere form of agency.  
 
I will explain how can this be done, while addressing the triviality worry, 
first in a roundabout way, relying again on the judgement of reflection. In 
an anti-empiricist, anti-sensationist move, Kant defines pleasure in general 
as a state of mind 'in which a representation is in agreement with itself' 
(20:231). The pleasure he associates with the judgements of reflection of the 
beautiful and of the sublime are those in which, he says, the representation 
is the ground for preserving the state itself. In the case of the beautiful, we 
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can understand this to mean that we are at one with ourselves and entirely 
absorbed in the experience. In the case of the sublime, the encounter with 
the immeasurable or the terrifying object gives us pleasure because, while 
jarring, it also allows us to latch onto a representation that is in agreement 
with itself and so affords us the experience of being at one with ourselves. 
The sublime is complex because the object of the experience challenges our 
abilities, we cannot overpower it or get the measure of it. At the same time, 
we do not have to overpower or get the measure of the object. No such tasks 
confront us. So the experience is not one of failure. The experience is 
fulfilling though no end is fulfilled, because it is the closest we come to a 
pure contemplation of our sort of agency: finite yet capable. 'Finite' stands 
for the limitations encountered in setting out to do things, so that it makes 
sense to speak of trying to do things. Finite yet capable gives us the 'can' 
modality of agency. In Kantian terms, the purposiveness (Zweckmässigkeit) of 
the judgement of the sublime concerns the form of the subject as someone 
who can set ends (Zwecke), including highest ends addressing rational 
beings, the ends of reason, but all such ends are tasks, that is, ends pursued 
in a world that is not rigged for their realisation. 
 
The sublime affords us a practical release, in parallel to the cognitive release 
of the beautiful: we can't do anything when confronted by the immeasurable 
and the terrifying, but, because we don't need to either, we become 
receptive to our identity as active beings without any reference to any 
contents of ends or sorts of ends. We are at one with ourselves insofar as we 
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1 Rayman 2012 is an example of the first, Crowther 2010, cited also in 
Hanauer 2016, of the second. 
2 It is similarly dialectical reasons that motivate my adoption of a naturalistic 
framework for the discussion of the sublime on which Hanauer remarks (see 
xxx). 
3 I think this is especially plausible if we think not in terms of empirical 
psychology, which Kant associates with study of pain (Schmerz) and pleasure 
(Lust) (5:266), but with the sort of a priori invertigation that concerns 
pleasure in the beautiful and the peculiar combination of pleasure with 
displeasure (Unlust) that is the sublime. 
4 Precedence resembles twentieth century cognitivist views about emotions 
(not feelings). Characteristic are Solomon's statements that '[a]n emotion is a 
basic judgement about our Selves and our place in the world' (1976, 187) and 
that '[e]motions are judgements that have already been made' (1976, 192). 
Also from the same date Davidson's cognitive account of Hume on pride 
(1976). 
5 The passage from §29, which contains the claim that a man who is not 
moved by the sublime has no feeling, reflects 18th century views about 
feeling and its cultivation. However Kant also says that 'refined feeling' is 
meaningless. This shows that he is not just repeating familiar motifs, he is 
incorporating elements of the contemporary discussion into an analysis of 
the power of judgement, and 'transpose[s] them into transcendental 
philosophy' as he says (5:266). The notion of receptivity allows a passive yet 
not pathological element in the discussion of judgement (see too 6:399f). 
6 Kant almost says this when he describes the sublime as an object 'the 
representation of which determines the mind to think' a series of thoughts 
(5:268). I find Robinson 2010 very useful for thinking through these issues. 
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7 The example is non-Kantian only because Kant associates pain and 
pleasure with empirical psychology and so not with the level of analysis of 
the sublime he undertakes in the third Critique. 
8 It is possible for the feeling not to occur, but it is not possible for the 
feeling to occur and to lack the relational content ascribed to it. By contrast, 
I may have a feeling of pain and there being nothing wrong with my thumb. 
